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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

BRIAN ARMSTRONG and GLENDA
ARMSTRONG, husband and wife,

Supreme Court No. 34250
Case No. CV 03-9214

Plaintiffs/Appellants,

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF

vs.
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF
IDAHO, an Idaho corporation; CORPORATE
DOES I - X, whose true names are unknown,

-COPY

Defendants/Respondents.

!s,,prenle Coun ____ Cotut of Appllals
1
-··--- ..... ,_,.. ••

_En1eredon_ATS_by:_ -

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from the District Court of the
First Judicial District for Kootenai County

The Honorable Charles W. Hosack, District Judge, Presiding

Douglas S. Marfice
April M. Linscott
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
618 N. 4 th Street
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Attorneys for Appellants

Patrick E. Miller, Esq.
ATTORNEY AT LAW
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101
P.O. BoxE
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-0328
Attorney for Respondents
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ARGUMENT
The issue presented on appeal is whether the District Court erred in its broad
detennination that Farmers is not obligated to compensate the Anustrongs under contract or
any other theory of law. The Arrnstrongs argue that the District Court impermissibly granted
sununary judgment to non-moving party Farmers on issues that were not raised or addressed
by moving party Annstrongs and that the District Court incorrectly interpreted the
Armstrongs' insurance policy as a matter oflaw.

I.

The District Court, in error, granted summary judgment to the nonmoving party (Farmers) on an issue that was not raised or addressed by
the moving party (Armstrongs).

The Annstrongs moved the District Court for partial summary judgment in the fom1
ofa declaration interpreting a provision of their homeowner's insurance policy and enforcing
their right to coverage. R. p. 79. The sole contract provision that the Armstrongs sought
interpretation of was the provision providing coverage for loss caused by sudden, accidental
discharge of water from a household appliance. R. p. 82. The Farmer's Policy includes a
blanketexclusjon for water. However, within the water damage exclusion sonie coverage is
given back (i.e. - loss caused by water which has escaped from an appliance).
Farmers never made a cross motion for sunu11ary judgment. However, it did respond
to the Annstrongs' motion. In Fanners' response, it acknowledged that the only issue before
the Court was whether an ambiguity under the policy exists. R. p. 91. Further, Farmers'
briefing only addressed the ambiguity related to the policy provision providing coverage for
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water from within a household appliance. R. p. JOI. Farmers' summary judgment briefing
also pointed to disputes of facts unrelated to the appliance provision.
The Annstrongs' Reply briefing focused the District Court on the nanow issue of the
appliance provision. R. p. 145. The Annstrongs informed the District Court that for purposes
of their motion for summary judgment, the Annstrongs were not raising issues of coverage
unrelated to the appliance provision of the Policy. R. p. 145. The Annstrongs aclmowledged
that issues of fact existed on other theories of recovery. Id.

That is precisely why the

Armstrongs narrowed their summary judgment argument. The District Court then broadly
ruled that under the facts of this case, Farmers was not obligated to compensate the
Am1strongs for their losses under any theory. R. p. 180.
The Armstrongs are not appealing the District Court's denial of their Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment.

They are appealing the District Court's ruling granting

summary judgment to non-moving party Farmers. The District Court, in a procedural game
of hopscotch, granted summary judgment to non-moving Farmers by having Farmers file a
motion for summary judgment after the ruling was already made. See, Tr. p. 3, ll. 16 -25; p.
4, ll. 1-6 (2007).

The District Court recognized that it could have granted summary judgment against
the Armstrongs sua sponte when ruling on the Annstrongs' motion for summary judgment.
However the Court did not "take that extra step" since no cross-motion for summary
judgment had been made. See, Tr. p. 4, ll. 19-25 (2007). The District Court acknowledge
that granting Farmer's Motion for Summary Judgment was the same as if it had granted the
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non-moving party summary judgment at the time the Armstrongs' filed their motion for
Summary Judgment. See, Tr. p. 6, ll. 5-19; p. 7, ll. 1-7 (2007). All parties agreed that this
was the proceeding that was taking place.
In granting Fa1mers' Motion for Summary Judgment the District Court was trying to
avoid "hassles" on appeal from a procedural basis. See, Tr. p. 3 ll. 16-22 (2007). The intent
of parties' procedural actions was to avoid the appellate court from saying there's some
question about the appealability of this case. Tr. p. 6, ll. 1-5 (2007).
The issue that the District Court and the parties was trying to avoid is the same
procedural issue that Farmers is now raising.

Farmers' argues that the Armstrongs should

not be allowed to appeal the denial of their motion for summary judgment while at the same
time raising issues for the first time on appeal. The Armstrongs are not raising issues for the
first time on appeal, nor are they appealing a denial of their motion for summary judgment.
The Armstrongs are raising issues that were never considered by the court when it granted
summary judgment to Farmers. Summary judgment cam10t be based on issues raised sua
sponte by the District Court without affording parties adequate advance notice and
opportunity to respond to issues raised by the court. Mason v. Tucker and Assoc., 125 Idaho
429, 432, 871 P.2d 846, 849 (Ct. App. 1994). In instances where summary judgment is
granted to the non-moving party, the record should be liberally construed in favor of the
party against whom summary judgment was entered. Harwood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672,
677-678, 39 P.3d 612, 617-618 (2001).
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As a result of the Annstrongs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment the District
Court made a blanket detennination that the no coverage existed for the Annstrongs' claims.
R. p. 180. This had the same effect as granting SUlrunary judgment to Farmers. In fact this

was the same bases that Farmers raised for moving for summary judgment in its motion. R.
pp. 190-191. The District Court had already ruled that Farmers was not obligated under any

theory of law to compensate the Armstrongs. Based on this ruling the Annstrongs did not
have a basis to oppose Farmers' Motion for Summary Judgment. A district court must not be
allowed to decide a issue that a party did not have advance notice of and opportunity to
demonstrate why summary judgment should not be entered. Harwood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho
at 678, 39 P.3d at 618.
As the non-moving party, the Arrnstrongs had no occasion to raise issues of fact
regarding their other claims for coverage. In their complaint the Annstrong's alleged causes
of action for breach of contract of insurance, breach of covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, negligent investigation and claim adjustment, unfair trade practice in violation of
I.C. § 41-1329 and 41-1831, and constructive fraud relating to the issue of whether there was
insurance coverage. Each of these claims on any theory of Jaw were wiped out by the
District Court's premature ruling that no coverage existed.
The sole issue presented in Am1strongs' Motion for Partial Smmnary Judgment was
the interpretation of the appliance provision. This created no need for the Armstrongs to
present evidence on their other theories of recovery. Nor did Farmer's motion alert them to
submit legal authorities and argument regarding other theories of recovery. The Armstrongs
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had no notice that their entire case about to be dismissed. Therefore, they had no opportunity
to demonstrate that it should not be dismissed. Once the Armstrongs had notice ofFa1mers'
motion for summary judgment, the District Court had already made its ruling. This case
must be sent back on remand.
II.

The District Court's decision should be vacated and the case remanded
for further proceedings on the issue of whether Farmers is obligated by
contract or oral binder to compensate the Armstrongs for their loss to
dwelling and personal property.

In its detennination that no coverage existed for the Armstrongs' claimed losses, the
court did not consider coverage arguments other than the narrow one present to it in the
Armstrongs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

Theories of recovery based on

provisions in the policy other than the appliance provision and other equitable and public
policy theories were not considered by the District Court. The Armstrongs must be allowed
to present other theories of their case that were not presented at summary judgment. The
Annstrongs purposely avoided those theories because they recognized that material issues of
fact existed and a trial would need to be heard by a fact finder. The Annstrongs incorporate
by reference their previous aTguments on appeal and on summary judgment below.
CONCLUSION

The District Court's Orders should be vacated and the case remanded for further
proceedings.

The District Court erred in its ruling that Farmers is not obligated to

compensate the Armstrongs under any contract theory or any other theory of!aw.
II
II
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Respectfully submitted this 13 th day of March, 2008.

RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
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